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Abstract. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, the consequences of
misinformation are a matter of life and death. Correcting misconceptions
and false beliefs are important for injecting reliable information about
the outbreak. Fact-checking organisations produce content with the aim
of reducing misinformation spread, but our knowledge of its impact on
misinformation is limited. In this paper, we explore the relation between
misinformation and fact-checking spread during the Covid-19 pandemic.
We specifically follow misinformation and fact-checks emerging from
December 2019 to early May 2020. Through a combination of spread
variance analysis, impulse response modelling and causal analysis, we show
similarities in how misinformation and fact-checking information spread
and that fact-checking information has a positive impact in reducing
misinformation. However, we observe that its efficacy can be reduced,
due to the general amount of online misinformation and the short-term
spread of fact-checking information compared to misinformation.
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1 Introduction
Recent research indicates that misinformation spreads much faster than true
information by exploiting emotions [32]. At the moment, public attention to
danger is heightened and fear may influence behaviour [9]. Misinformation about
Covid-19 has been rampant on social media [6,5], with some tragic results12.
Studying the spread of misinformation about Covid-19 helps us to understand
what information correction the public needs during a health crisis. It also
helps to distinguish patterns and timings that are significant in the spread of
misinformation.
1 BBC – The cost of virus misinformation, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
stories-52731624.
2 The Guardian – UN warns of deadly effect of Covid-19 misinfor-
mation in Pacific, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/
un-warns-of-deadly-effect-of-covid-19-misinformation-in-pacific.
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We compare the diffusion of 2,830 misinformation and 734 fact-checking URLs
about Covid-19 on Twitter,3 from early December 2019 to early May 2020 in
order to understand the spread of misinformation and fact-checks over time.
First, we analyse how spread differs during the pandemic by observing changes
between the initial pandemic onset, the ramping up phase and late pandemic
period (Covid-19 level). Second, we study the relative misinformation and fact-
checking diffusion patterns by aligning individual URL spreads and analysing how
individual misinformation spread after their initial appearance (relative level).
We address the following research questions: Are misinformation and fact-
checking information shared similarly? How do misinformation and fact-checking
spread patterns vary at the pandemic level and relative level? and How does
fact-checking spread affect the diffusion of misinformation about Covid-19?
2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss some of the propositions that researchers have made
regarding the spread of misinformation and fact-checks on social networks. We
highlight the complexity of establishing the impact of fact-checks on misinforma-
tion sharing, to which our study contributes.
2.1 Misinformation Spread Analysis
Most studies of misinformation spread tend to be focused on early intervention
and removal [3]. In this context, many works have focused on the application
and extensions of epidemiological models [12,13,3] with additional features like
weighted values for particular users [29] or, more recently, information about
debunkers and the dynamics of opinion evolution [23]. Notably, Saxena et al [23]
demonstrated that identifying influential nodes may also help exploit the spread
of fact-checked information and impact user opinion over time.
Several works investigate the role of different topological features in misinfor-
mation spread [2,30,35,8], finding that some topic/audience interdependencies
may increase the spread of misinformation, perhaps related to cultural norms,
experiences or values [7]. Likewise, chains or groups of nodes may accelerate
the spread of misinformation [22] and, as Xian et al demonstrate, individuals
can be exposed to and share misinformation across platforms [34]. In the con-
text of the current crisis, Cinelli et al [6] analysed spread patterns of different
Covid-19 related misinformation across several platforms. The authors noted
different diffusion patterns for different types of misinformation on each platform.
Researchers are beginning to explore the role of social media hype in accelerating
both panic and therefore uptake of misinformation about Covid-19 and other
viral pandemics on social media [10].
Most researchers agree that the biggest impacts of misinformation happen
within a short time span from the initial circulation [26]. Misinformation spikes
3 Twitter, http://twitter.com.
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are prevalent during times of conflict and war [16], and during politic events [15].
Misinformation often accompanies breaking news developments, when people are
looking for more details, as well as during disasters, when they might desperately
need information about where to go or what to do next [26].
Existing research has mostly focused on analysing misinformation spread
alone without much focus on whether fact-checking information impacts the
spread of misinformation. Although topological and social features are important
for characterising misinformation spread, we decide to leave these features in
our study and focus on the co-spread of misinformation and fact-checks with a
particular focus on different time periods. We leave additional topological and
user analysis as future work.
2.2 Fact-Checking Information Spread
Fact-checks are a type of information that is distinct from just “true”, or “false”
information. Researchers already showed that true information and misinforma-
tion spread differently [32]. Fact-checks assess claims for accuracy [31], hence
representing a new category of information [11]. At the time of writing, we could
not identify work looking computationally at the diffusion of fact-checking in a
network, in particular to assess causal relationships to misinformation.
Tambuscio et al [28] used agent-based simulations to develop a two parts
epidemiological model for defining the “minimal reaction” necessary to get rid
of a viral hoax, but this was not transferred to a real dataset. Later work by
Kim et al [14] used real-world datasets from Twitter and Weibo4 to model how
the network could be mobilised to spread corrective information effectively. Still,
these models are meant to predict how future fact-checks may diffuse and not to
estimate existing causal relationships.
Researchers have looked at the usefulness of fact-checking from a variety of
perspectives. Nyhan and Reifler [21] found that attitudes toward fact-checking
in the USA were generally supportive. However, they noted that scepticism
toward fact-checking may stem from a lack of trust in fact-checking entities. More
recently, Barrera et al [4] found that fact-checking did improve voters’ knowledge,
but did not appear to impact policy, or support for individual candidates. This
phenomenon was also reported by researchers in the context of the 2016 USA
presidential election [27]. In their exploration of the Australian presidential
election in 2017, Aird et al found that the number of corrections must outweigh
the number of affirmations of the misinforming claim, in order to have a stronger
impact on belief and behaviour [1]. Similar findings were echoed in[26].
A recent extensive review of fact-checking literature performed by Nieminen
et al showed that the corrective potential of fact-checking was a dominate subject
of research, but that subjectivity in fact-checking assessment, the overempha-
sis of fact-checking in the US, and a lack of clarity around correcting beliefs
were continued challenges [20]. Assessing the impact of fact-checking from the
perspective of individuals consuming fact-checks is difficult to do in laboratory
4 Weibo, http://weibo.com.
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settings. In our work, we focus on assessing the presence and diffusion of both
misinformation and fact-checks on Twitter, to explore temporal patterns and
evidence of causal relationship.
3 Co-Spread of Misinformation and Corrective
Information during the Covid-19 Pandemic
The review of existing work investigating misinformation spread shows a gap in
understanding the relation and interaction between the corrective information
propagated by fact-checking and misinformation spread. We conduct an analysis
on the co-spread of fact-checking information and misinformation on Twitter
based on the sharing of misinforming URLs that were collected from claim
reviews collected from fact-checking websites. The data was collected as part of
the misinfo.me platform [17] up to the 4th May 2020.
In our approach, first, we collect Twitter data by looking for the appearance
of misinforming URLs that we have collected. Second, misinformation and fact-
checks spread is aggregated for three different time periods at two different
granularity: 1) From the Covid-19 worldwide spread perspective (Covid-19 level
analysis), and; 2) From the initial emergence of a misinforming URL (relative level
analysis). This allows for a better understanding of spread at different levels. Third,
we perform multiple analyses to investigate how fact-checks and misinformation
spread behaviour differs. This analysis allows the identification of significant
relations between misinformation spread and fact-checking information, which
can be used for designing better methods for spreading fact-checking information
on social media. Finally, weak causation and impulse response analyses are
performed between fact-checks and misinformation in order to identify if fact-
checking information diffusion impacts misinformation spread.
3.1 Dataset
For our analysis, we need to create a dataset that contains both misinformation
and fact-checking information. We focus our work on Twitter due to its popularity
and its accessibility. We rely on COVID19-related reports from fact-checking
websites that identify misinforming content by their URLs, and search the
occurrences of these URLs in user posts on Twitter.
Fact-checker URLs Dataset The dataset of fact-checks comes from the mis-
info.me tool [17], that collects URLs that have been fact-checked, labelled and
provided with a fact-checker review. The reviews are published by multiple fact-
checking websites belonging to the International Fact-Checking Network5 (IFCN)
using the standard ClaimReview schema6, which was defined appositely for the
purpose of annotating reviews of claims. The data collection is primarily based
5 IFCN, https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories.
6 ClaimReview Schema, https://schema.org/ClaimReview.
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on the Data Commons ClaimReview public feed.7 From this public feed, ratings
are extracted and normalised between [−1; +1] depending on their credibility [18].
Using these ratings, we only select misinforming URLs (ratings ≤ 0). Although,
different levels of misinformation exist (e.g., manipulation, misleading informa-
tion, forgery, etc.), we focus our investigation on any type of misinformation in
order to simplify the analysis. We also keep the URLs of the original fact-checking
articles and then filter all the URLs to only get the Covid-19 fact-checks by using
a set of relevant keywords8 based the title and content of the fact-checks. The
final URL dataset includes fact-checks published until the 4th of May 2020, with
a total of 2,830 distinct misinforming URLs and 734 fact-checking URLs.
Twitter Dataset Using the misinforming and fact-checking URLs, we create the
Twitter dataset by searching their occurrences on Twitter by adapting an existing
Twitter Hashtag crawler that collect posts using Twitter’s mobile interface.9 Out
of all the seed URLs, we find posts for only 1,190 distinct URLs for a total of
21,394 posts from 16,308 different users. On average, there are 17.54 posts for
each URL (σ = 28.35, min = 1, max = 232).
Figure 1 shows the cumulative spread of misinforming and fact-checking
information URLs shared over time in our dataset. The figure also shows the
amount of Covid-19 casualties and cases over the same period as well as the
Covid-19 initial, early and late periods (vertical dashed lines).
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Fig. 1. Stacked cumulative spread of misinforming and corrective information URLs
over time and amount of Covid-19 casualties and cases over the same time period.
Covid-19 Cases Dataset To generate the different time periods at the Covid-
19 pandemic granularity, we use the data produced by the European Center
7 ClaimReview Public Feed, https://www.datacommons.org/factcheck/download.
8 Twitter Covid-19 keywords, https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/labs/
covid19-stream/filtering-rules.
9 Twitter Scrapper, https://github.com/amitupreti/Hands-on-WebScraping.
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for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDPC).10 The ECDPC collects daily
statistics about the number of Covid-19 cases and causalities worldwide for
multiple countries. Although, the data is continuously updated, in our work we
focus on the 1st Dec. 2019 to 4th May 2020 period since it matches the data we
collected on Twitter. The beginning date is selected as the 1st Dec. 2019 since
this date tends to be associated with the first traceable case of the pandemic [33].
3.2 Analysed Periods Generation
We analyse the behaviour of fact-checking information and misinformation at two
different granularity levels. First, at the pandemic level (Covid-19 level analysis),
we are interested in understanding if spread behaviour varies during three different
time period within the pandemic based on the the amount of worldwide cases.
Second, at the URL level (relative analysis), we are interested in understanding
how behaviour differs based on the number of days since the first occurrence
of a misinformation-related URL (i.e., a particular misinforming content or its
associated fact-checking information). This would show how misinformation and
fact-checks spread over time independently from when they were posted.
Covid-19 Periods We generate three initial, early and late time periods to
analyse fact-checking information and misinformation spreads at the level of
the Covid-19 pandemic. We fit multiple linear regression models for the daily
worldwide Covid-19 cases curve in order to identify inflection points in the amount
of Covid-19 cases [19].
Looking for two inflection points in the curve, the initial time period is
specified as any tweet posted before Saturday, Mar 14, 2020. Early period
corresponds to any tweet between Saturday, Mar 14, 2020 and Thursday, Apr 2,
2020. Late period is for any posts after Thursday, Apr 2, 2020.
Relative Periods To understand sharing behaviour independently from when
each URL has been initially shared, we align the initial sharing of each URL
so that all the URLs shared in the dataset always start from the same initial
time (i.e., we normalise the dates for each analysed URL). We identify the first
occurrence of each URL and then obtain the number of times it has been shared
per day for each day following its initial appearance.
Following the same approach outlined in the previous section, we use the daily
aggregated curve containing all the shared URLs (i.e., misinforming and fact-
checking URLs) for identifying the initial, early and late relative time periods by
obtaining the inflection point in the daily shared URLs. Using the aforementioned
method, the initial time period is specified as any URL shares happening within
the first 2 days after its first occurrence. The early period correspond to share
between day 2 and day 14. Finally the late period is for any shares happening
after 14 days.
10 ECDC Covid-19 Data, https://opendata.ecdc.europa.eu/covid19/casedistribution/
csv.
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4 Multivariate Spread Variance Analysis
The first part of the analysis is to identify the different patterns of appearance of
misinformation and fact-check URLs over varying periods of time. In order to
perform such analysis, we use the one way Multivariate ANalysis Of VAriance
(MANOVA) and the one way ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA) methods. This
approach allows us to determine if there are significant differences in information
spread between the fact-checking information and misinformation groups in each
initial, early and late periods.
4.1 Experimental Setup
MANOVA and ANOVA rely on the definition of independent variables and
dependent variables. For our analysis, the amount of information spread associated
with each information type is our dependent variable whereas each information
type (i.e., misinformation and corrective information) is an independent variable.
Since our data does not follow all the assumptions required for the standard
ANOVA and MANOVA methods (i.e., multicollinearity, normality and homogene-
ity), we use non-parametric versions of MANOVA and ANOVA for the analysis,
using F-approximations permutation tests. The F-approximation of ANOVA’s
test, as well as Wilks’ Lambda Type Statistic are obtained with their p-value
and the associated permutation test p-value.
Our analysis is divided into two different parts for the Covid-19 and rela-
tive level analyses: 1) A Non-parametric MANOVA analysis is performed for
identifying if there are differences in spread between the different periods and
information types, then; 2) Non-parametric ANOVA analysis is then performed
if the MANOVA results are significant for each individual time period for deter-
mining in which sub-period (i.e., initial, early and late) the pattern differs.
For the non-parametric ANOVA analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis test is used
and the p values are adjusted using Bonferroni correction (since multiple de-
pendent variables are analysed). Significant results mean that the behaviour of
corrective information and misinformation are significantly different whereas a
non-significant result means that the distribution of spread for each time period
is non-significant.
4.2 Results
In the following section we only report significant results for brevity.
Covid-19 Period Analysis The one way MANOVA analysis comparison at
the Covid-19 level URL shares for misinforming URLs and fact-checking URLs
shows a significant permuted p-value of 0.01. This means that at the Covid-19
pandemic level, there are significant differences in how misinforming URLs and
fact-checking URLs spread and that the type of shared URLs has an effect on
the amount of shared URLs during the pandemic. Following the significant result
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of the MANOVA analysis, a one way ANOVA analysis is performed for each
Covid-19 time period. The Bonferroni adjusted Kruskall-Wallis tests are only
significant for the initial (p = 0.00558) and late (p = 0.0234) periods. This result
means that sharing behaviour does not differ fundamentally during the early
Covid-19 period (p = 1) whereas sharing behaviour differs in the other periods.
Looking at the individual URLs shares for each time periods, we observe
higher deviations in sharing behaviour for misinformation (σ ∈ {20.5, 24.9, 26.3})
compared to fact-checking information (σ ∈ {7.52, 6.94, 11.3}). It also appears
that fact-checked information is shared less often than the corresponding mis-
informing URLs in term of means with lower means for all the time periods
(2.42 < 5.88, 3.60 < 8.73 and 6.34 < 10). This suggests that perhaps the types
of users that share misinformation is more varied than the types of users that
share fact-checks. Similarly, there may be a variation in what misinforming topic
attracts the most shares compared to the fact-checking content.
Relative Period Analysis The one way MANOVA analysis comparison at the
relative URL shares level for misinforming URLs and fact-checking URLs shows
a significant permuted p-value of 0. This means that at the relative URL level,
there are significant differences in how misinforming URLs and fact-checking
URLs spread and that the type of shared URLs has an effect on the amount of
spread at different relative time periods.
Following the significant result of the MANOVA analysis, a one way ANOVA
analysis is performed for each relative time period. The Bonferroni adjusted
Kruskall-Wallis tests are only significant for the early (p = 4.74× 10−4) and late
(p = 1.338× 10−5) periods. This means that sharing behaviour during the initial
(p = 0.522) relative period does not differs during that period whereas differences
exists when looking at the early and late periods.
The individual distribution of misinforming and fact-checking URLs for each
time period show that the amount of shares tends to be similar across the
URL types with a slightly higher spread for the misinforming URLs in general.
Interestingly, the highest difference in term of mean and standard deviation
between the different URL types appears to be mostly during the initial phase
with a more important standard deviation for the misinforming URLs (σ = 12.6
for misinforming content and σ = 3.31 for fact-checks).
5 Fact-checking Misinformation Impact Analysis
In this section we investigate how the two types of information (fact-checking
URLs and misinforming URLs) impact each other. In particular, we are interested
in understanding if the spread of fact-checking information has a beneficial
impact in reducing the diffusion of misinformation. For this analysis, we focus on
modelling the spread of URLs as a Vector AutoRegression (VAR) model using
the misinformation and fact-checking URLs as endogenous variables. We perform
this analysis at the relative level (i.e., the relative number of days since the first
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appearance of a URL related to a particular misinformation) and determines if
weak causation relations between each information types exists.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Although it is not simple to identify causation relations between each information
types, it is possible to estimates if the spread of a given information type can be
used to predict the spread of another information type using a Granger causality
test. In order to compute the Granger causality test we first build a Vector
AutoRegression (VAR) model using the combined misinformation spread and
fact-checking information for the analysed period. However, since our data is
non-stationary, we first integrate each analysed information types so that the
spread amount for each day is represented as the difference between the current
day value and the previous day value.
A 14 days order value is used for the VAR model based on Akaike’s information
criterion. Using the VAR(14) model, we perform a bootstrapped Granger causality
test for determining if misinformation spread can be associated with fact-checking
URL spread or if fact-checking spread can be inferred from misinformation spread.
In order to understand the dynamics that relate fact-checking and misinfor-
mation, impulse response analysis is performed as well as Forecast Error Variance
Decomposition (FEVD). For the impulse response analysis, we use orthogonal
impulse responses in order to evaluate the spread response of the different types
of URLs for 14 days steps. This approach allow us to determines how a particular
sharing behaviour may affect other types of URLs shares in future. We are
particularly interested in determining if an increase in fact-checking information
shares trigger a reduction in misinformation diffusion. We run the FEVD with
the same 14 days periods in order to obtain the contribution importance of each
information types on both misinforming URLs and fact-checking URLs spread.
5.2 Results
Using the VAR(14) model, we observe a Granger causality relation showing
that fact-checking spread has predictive causality over misinformation spread
(p = 0.02). This observation is not found in the opposite direction (p = 0.93).
This result suggests that at the relative-level, change in fact-checking information
spread may cause a change in misinformation spread and therefore fact-checking
articles have an impact on misinformation spread. Surprisingly, the opposite
result shows that fact-checking spread may not be influenced by misinformation.
The impulse response for the orthogonal shock in the amount of shared fact-
checking URLs (Figure 2) shows an initial drop in misinformation shares (first
day) but mixed results afterwards. Despite this observation, a general downward
misinformation spread trend can be observed. This suggests that fact-checking
tend to have a short significant impact on the spread of misinformation. A shock
in misinformation leads to a sharp drop in misinformation spread. This confirms
our previous observation that misinformation spreads tend to occurs mostly after
its initial spread and decrease quickly in the following days.
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The impulse response for the orthogonal shock in the amount of shared
misinforming URLs (Figure 3) shows a delayed fact-checking increase two days
after the initial misinformation spread. This result suggests that fact-checking
spread tend to follow misinformation spread despite a lack of causal relation (i.e.,
fact-checking articles are created as a response to misinformation). As with the
misinformation sharing behaviour, we observe a sharp decrease in fact-checking
sharing behaviour after the initial shock as initial sharing behaviour reduces.
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Fig. 3. Bootstrapped relative-level orthogonal impulse response from misinformation
shock (95% confidence interval).
The FEVD results displayed in Figure 4 show that misinformation spread
predictions are directly affected by the spread of fact-checking information
with misinformation prediction getting more affected by fact-checking spread
as time goes by whereas fact-checking spread appears to be unaffected by past
misinformation spread. This result adds to our previous causality observation
between fact-checking information and misinformation spread.
6 Discussion
Our results show that at the Covid-19 level, fact-checked URLs are less shared
(compared to misinformation in term of mean) during all the periods and that the
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standard deviation and mean are much higher for misinforming URLs. This indi-
cates that there may be some intrinsic features of misinforming URLs, potentially
related to topic or sentiment, for example, that make them more shareable than
fact-checks. This echoes previous work that describes the enticement of emotion
and novelty in misinformation [32]. Likewise, this also indicates that the commu-
nities sharing fact-checks and those sharing misinformation are likely different
indicating that previous agent-based models that address the impact of fact-
checkers on a network [28,23] may need to be adjusted for lower-than-expected
inter-community contact. Finally, significant differences in sharing behaviour
appears mostly during the ramping up period of the pandemic (early phase)
with large variations in deviation and means toward misinformation. This may
be explained by the heightened fears and extreme uncertainty concerning the
pandemic during that particular period in which the public need for information
is outweighing the authority’s ability to provide it [9,25,24].
At the relative level, we confirm previous findings showing the initial stage
of circulation is associated with highest information spread in general [26]. The
absence of significance in general behaviour during the initial period and the
observed high difference in standard deviation during that period shows that
most difference in spread behaviour happens in the later periods and may be
associated with the virality of misinforming content and its ability to spread
deeper compared to fact-checks [32]. This result also highlights that the difference
in spread may be highly related to the initial amount of shares of a given URL
and to external contextual factors rather than the intrinsic properties of the
shared URLs (e.g, the relation between the pandemic state and the misinforming
URLs topics rather than simply the misinforming URLs topics).
Causality analysis confirms that misinformation spread can be predicted from
fact-checking spread. This relation is also confirmed by the FEVD analysis (Figure
4). However, the opposite relation is not observed meaning that fact-checking
spread behaviour is not causally related to misinforming behaviour even though
impulse analysis show that to some extent misinformation spread shocks tend to
lead to an initial increase in fact-checking spread.
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Although the previous observation is encouraging, our results (Section 5) show
that the reduction in misinformation spread associated with an increase in fact-
checking information is mostly temporary. This indicates that the misinformation
reduction power of fact-checking is impeded by its apparent inability to be
shared over long periods of time. This echoes previous research that suggested
that the amount of corrective information may play an essential role in reducing
misinformation [1,26]. To this end, better fact-checking campaigns may be required
to increase the virality of fact-checking content for increasing its shareability.
7 Limitations and Future Work
Although our approach is really accurate, since it does not depends on automatic
annotations for identifying misinformation and fact-checks, our data covers only
a small amount of misinformation and does not contain variations of the same
posts. Similarly, the amount of collected posts is limited by the data collection
method. A relatively simple approach for future work would be to use automatic
misinformation detection methods coupled with semantic similarity measures to
detect content that is already fact-checked but associated with different URLs.
We could also combine different data collection methods for improving the fidelity
of our study. As our results have shown, additional topological and community
analysis is required to better characterise the deviations and mean differences
observed in the multivariate spread analysis (Section 6). We plan to increase
the granularity of our analysis by obtaining more fine grained information about
the users (e.g., demographics) that share misinformation as well as intrinsic
misinformation and fact-checking content features such as topical information.
8 Conclusion
We have presented an initial analysis of the relation between misinformation
spread and fact-checking information during the initial period of the Covid-19
pandemic. Although our results show that fact-checking spread has a positive
impact in reducing misinformation, we have found that the impact of fact-
checking is seriously impeded by three different factors: the amount of shared
misinformation (which is disproportionately higher than fact-checking content),
the different communities of fact-check sharers versus misinformation sharers,
and the short period of time in which fact-checks are likely to spread. To overcome
this, it will be necessary to build interaction bridges between fact-checking and
misinformation spreaders, and create fact-checking content that is more appealing.
This will help create a sustainable fact-checking information spread over time.
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